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ed a decade earlier.1 In 2013, President Vladimir Putin an-
nounced the intention to pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region 
by turning to eastern markets and by developing the Siberian 
and the Far Eastern districts. Though underdeveloped, the 
Far Eastern and Siberian districts are rich sources of energy 
resources and raw materials, and how the development of 
these districts will affect the region’s governance and security 
is a timely topic of regional and international policy interest. 
In the wake of the Ukraine crisis since 2014, Russia’s ap-
proach to its “Go East” policy has been facing new constraints. 
Moscow no longer has the option of accommodating both the 
U.S. and China while maintaining non-alignment and is now 
more limited when it comes to managing its competing inter-
ests with China, for instance in Central Asia. At the same time, 
scholars have argued that the pivot has been given a push by 
the cutting of Russia-Europe ties and that the Ukraine crisis 
has been a major catalyst for certain relationships, namely 
enhanced Sino-Russian strategic and bilateral cooperation. 
While the details of Russia’s turn to the east have been rela-
tively well studied, the international community still has lim-
ited knowledge about how the Ukraine crisis has influenced 
this multifaceted endeavor. Specifically, a clear picture of how 
this development has affected Japan-Russia energy relations 
has not appeared, since both sides have been very quiet about 
how the Ukraine crisis has affected the bilateral relationship. 
Thus, how has the sanctions regime (U.S., Europe, Japan) af-
fected the energy dimension of Russia’s “Go East” strategy 
and what are the ripple effects for the global energy market? 
Has Japan becoming part of the sanctions regime made Russia 
more eager to meet Chinese terms on energy deals? By tracing 
key developments in the energy sphere prior to and after Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea we develop a better understanding 
of how the Ukraine crisis has affected Japan-Russia energy re-
lations and the energy piece of Russia’s pivot to Asia.
Summary
Since the triple disaster in Japan in 2011, the energy 
dimension of Japan-Russia relations in the Russian Far 
East (RFE) has developed substantially. The integration of 
the energy markets of the world’s top liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) importer, Japan, and major energy exporter, Russia, 
has paralleled a warmer bilateral political climate and been 
accelerated by Russia’s turn to the East. In the aftermath 
of the Ukraine crisis, the globe’s energy landscape has 
been significantly altered and both Russia and Japan face 
new constraints economically and in terms of bilateral 
cooperation. While Japan and Russia have managed to 
maintain dialogue and energy cooperation despite Japan’s 
membership in the sanctions regime, questions remain 
about how bilateral energy relations will develop in the 
face of competition from Japan’s traditional energy suppli-
ers and ongoing Japanese government efforts to diversify 
energy sources. In considering the consequences of the 
Fukushima and Ukraine crises on Japan-Russia energy rela-
tions and the energy dimension of Russia’s pivot to Asia, 
the topic is placed in a wider context of recent geopolitical 
developments and energy security in the Asia-Pacific.
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Introduction
Japan-Russia relations have undergone notable develop-
ments over the past few years, despite the two nations never 
signing a formal peace treaty ending World War II and an 
ongoing territorial dispute over the Hoppō Ryōdo (Northern 
Territories, 北方領土), which has been a major obstacle to 
improved bilateral relations. Russia’s aspirations to establish 
itself as a Euro-Pacific power have met Japanese ambitions 
to secure its energy market to make for a promising dialogue 
on various security issues of mutual interest. Changing do-
mestic and regional contexts have allowed for a promising 
Russia-Japan partnership on energy issues. Between 2000 
and 2012, the share of oil and gas in Russian exports to Japan 
jumped from 1 to 74% while total trade between the countries 
reached US$37 billion in 2013, six times the amount record-
1 Based on UNCTADStat Database figures in Margaret Klein, “Russia: A Euro-Pa-
cific Power?: Goals, Strategies and Perspectives of Moscow’s East Asia Policy,” 
SWP Research Paper 8, September 2014: 31; “Abe and Putin Vow to Repair 
Ties Frayed Over Ukraine,” Bloomberg News, 10 November 2014. http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-09/abe-and-putin-to-hold-first-summit-since-
crimea-move-dented-ties.html
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Russia’s Situation
The Putin administration has acknowledged the global power 
shift towards the Asia-Pacific region and has made developing 
the RFE a top policy priority. A core piece of Russia’s pivot to Asia 
involves the development of its energy market and the secure-
ment of the role of raw energy supplier for energy-hungry East 
Asian markets.2 The RFE plays a large role in this endeavor given 
its comparative advantage in energy production and proximity 
to East Asia. Russia’s energy strategy for 2030 forecasts that the 
Asia-Pacific market will consume 22-25% of oil Russian exports 
and 19-20% of Russian gas exports.3 Accordingly, Russia has 
worked to broaden its energy outreach to various Asian part-
ners, including Vietnam, Laos, South Korea, China and Japan. 
The need for Moscow to develop energy cooperation has 
become critical in the post-crisis environment. Accounting for 
half of the state’s revenues, Russia’s energy sector is a crucial 
market for the national economy as well as for establishing 
political clout. Russia knows that it is a competitive energy 
provider in East Asia and has taken advantage of various 
opportunities to step in and step up energy cooperation with 
states of the region. China was notably absent as a Russian 
gas customer until 2013 when the countries signed significant 
oil and gas deals. In May 2014, the two countries finalized a 
landmark, US$400 billion, 33-year gas agreement, following 
years of negotiations over prices.4 The timing and stipulations 
of the long-anticipated deal naturally led to questions about 
the influence of Western sanctions on Russia’s energy market. 
Analysts suggest Beijing was able to leverage the economic 
difficulties brought about by the sanctions by offering Russia 
new markets for its energy supply at prices lower than what 
Russia would have been able to get from the European market, 
however Russian sources suggest that China offered a very 
generous price. The initial up-front payment on part of the 
megadeal is allegedly welcome security for Russia’s dwindling 
cash supply, which has been hit hard by the sanctions regime 
and the global drop in energy prices. Further, Russia’s invita-
tion of Chinese involvement in the upstream projects in the 
Arctic, Siberia and the Far East signal a potentially more open 
and inclusive approach to developing its energy market. Rus-
sia’s growing role in the Chinese energy market, as a supplier 
of electricity and gas, has paralleled ongoing dialogues with 
other Asian states, such as Japan, about energy cooperation. 
Japan’s Situation
Despite being a leader when it comes to energy efficiency and 
technology, the geographic position and makeup of Japan 
makes meeting the country’s large energy demands an unat-
tainable goal, especially when it comes to fossil fuels. Over 80% 
of the resource-poor, island nation’s energy use is imported 
and Japan ranks as the world’s biggest consumer of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG), second-largest coal importer and third-larg-
est oil purchaser.5 Formerly, the main form of domestic energy 
production took place at the nation’s 54 nuclear power plants, 
which accounted for roughly 30% of peak electricity.6 
Japan’s energy needs have undergone substantial changes since 
the triple disaster involving a magnitude 9.0 earthquake, tsunami 
and nuclear disaster in March 2011. The Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear plant crisis led to the shutdown of all domestic nuclear 
power plants and a major reassessment of Japan’s energy secu-
rity.7 In the following months, Japanese ministries developed 
plans to restructure Japan’s energy mix to meet its energy needs 
in a sustainable and nuclear-free fashion. The initial plan to work 
towards being nuclear-free by 2040 was revised to include fos-
sil fuels and renewable energy to make up for a good part of the 
nation’s nuclear handicap.8 As the world’s sixth-largest producer 
of solar power, Japan has explored the possibility of increasing the 
efficiency of this renewable energy.  9 Eliminating Japan’s nuclear 
crutch also meant seeking out new partnerships and solutions 
to meet the rising energy need. The Middle East supplies 90% of 
Japan’s energy imports, but Japan has relied less on this source 
and more on Russia and alternative sources over the past decade. 
Japan’s alliance with the U.S. is the centerpiece of Japan’s 
security policy. This makes it difficult for Japan to maintain 
relations with Russia at the level they were progressing at prior 
to the Ukraine crisis. Political support in Japan for joining the 
sanctions regime was mild considering both the political and 
business risks involved, however officials concurred that Japan 
had to follow the request of its closest ally and security partner. 
Under U.S. pressure, Japan reluctantly joined the G-7 sanctions 
regime but was careful to caveat that the Abe government was 
still interested in continuing dialogue with Moscow despite the 
suspension of talks regarding military matters, space issues 
and investment opportunities.10 Japanese sanctions were 
viewed by Russia as comparatively modest to those of the U.S. 
and Europe and thus dialogue and the amicable ‘Vladimir-
Shinzō’ relationship were maintained to the extent possible.11
Post-Fukushima, pre-Ukraine
For Russia-Japan energy relations, the triple disaster was a major 
catalyst. It paved the way for a longer-term deepening of bilat-
eral energy relations and also provided a quick fix to Japan’s 
precarious energy position in the wake of the disaster. Russia 
6 “Nuclear Power in Japan,” World Nuclear Association, January 2015. http://
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Japan/
7 At the time of writing, all power plants continued to remain shut down, how-
ever two reactors in Kagoshima prefecture in southern Japan are scheduled to 
be rebooted in 2015 once the plants’ safety review process is finalized. As of 
November 2014, twenty plants have applied to the Government of Japan, who 
makes final decisions once local referendums have been passed, for permission 
to restart their reactors. See “Nuclear Power in Japan: The Critical Mass,” The 
Economist, 3 Nov. 2014. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21630808-
country-lurches-towards-nuclear-comeback-critical-mass 
8 “Enerugi kihon keikaku (Strategic Energy Plan)”, Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI), Japan, Fourth Edition, April 2014. In English:http://www.
enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/pdf/4th_strategic_energy_
plan.pdf 
9 Julia Nesheiwat and Jeffrey S. Cross, “Japan’s post-Fukushima Reconstruction: 
A case study for implementation of sustainable energy technologies,” Energy 
Policy 60 (2013): 509-519.  
10 Martin Fackler, “Japan Imposes New Sanctions on Russia but Keeps a Diplo-
matic Door Open,” The New York Times, 5 August 2014. http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/08/06/world/asia/japan-keeps-door-to-russia-open-while-impos-
ing-sanctions.html 
11 Since re-assuming Prime Ministerial duties in December 2012, PM Abe Shinzō 
has met with President Putin ten times focusing on a range of issues and often 
including discussion about energy relations. During Abe’s first prime minister-
ship (2006-2007) the leaders also signed “Initiative for the Strengthening of 
Japan-Russia cooperation in the Far East Russia and Eastern Siberia,” an agree-
ment to boost cooperation between the private commercial actors in Japan and 
the Far East regions.
2 Gilbert Rozman, “The Russian Pivot to Asia,” The Asan Forum 3(6), 1 December 
2014. http://www.theasanforum.org/the-russian-pivot-to-asia/
3 “Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030,” Ministry of Energy of the 
Russian Federation, Institute of Energy Strategy, 2010. www.energystrategy.ru/
projects/docs/ES-2030_(Eng).pdf 
4 Iacob Koch-Weser and Craig Murray, “The China-Russia Gas Deal: Background 
and Implications for the Broader Relationship,” U.S.-China Economic and Se-
curity Review Commission, 9 June 2014. http://www.uscc.gov/Research/china-
russia-gas-deal-background-and-implications-broader-relationship
5 “Japan,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 31 July 2014. http://
www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ja 
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swiftly promised supplies of LNG, oil, coal and electricity and 
worked to accommodate Japan’s high LNG demand. Further, 
joint working groups on issues such as oil and gas were created. 
At present, Japan is involved in two major projects taking place 
on Sakhalin Island, the only location in the RFE where gas is 
extracted. The Sakhalin-1 pipeline – a collaborative effort 
between a Government of Japan (GOJ)-led consortium, (the 
group of public and private Japanese oil companies operate 
under the umbrella Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Com-
pany (SODECO) and own 30%), India, the U.S. and Russia – has 
been providing Japan with crude oil since 2009 and is expected 
to start supplying gas in 2018.12 The Sakhalin-2 pipeline is 
being developed by Japanese trading companies Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi (which together own 22.5%) in collaboration with 
Gazprom (which has a 50%-plus-one share stake) and Shell (UK-
Netherlands). The pipeline provides Japan with about 10% of 
its LNG needs – making it Japan’s fourth-largest supplier of LNG 
– and has increased its exports to Japan exponentially over the 
past five years. Among states in the Asian vector, Japan receives 
the largest amount of the plant’s exports (82% in 2013). The 
GOJ and private corporations are evaluating importing more gas 
from Sakhalin to meet 17-18% of Japan’s gas needs. In addition 
to the Sakhalin projects, in 2012, Japan revealed plans to build 
a $13 billion dollar LNG plant in Vladivostok.13 The plant, which 
is being developed by Gazprom in collaboration with a group 
of Japanese companies known as the Japan Far East Gas Com-
pany,14 is expected to begin LNG exports in late 2018 or early 
2019 and could account for around 13% of Japan’s gas imports. 
Although Japan relies on the Middle East for over 80% of 
its crude oil supply, Russia also provides Japan with crude 
oil. In addition to supplies coming from Sakhalin-2, since 
2009 Russia’s Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline 
–  which runs from Taishet, Siberia, to the Kozmino Bay Oil 
Terminal near Russia’s border with China – has been deliv-
ering crude oil to Japan.15 In 2014, Russia accounted for 
four percent of Japanese oil imports and there are plans to 
increase the supply, which will help meet Moscow’s target of 
sending a third of its crude oil exports to Asia by 2020. 
Since nuclear power no longer plays a significant role in its 
energy mix, Japan’s current strategy involves a diversification 
of Japan’s LNG sourcing in the foreseeable future and a greater 
dependency on renewables in the long term.16  Australia is a 
notable energy supplier, accounting for roughly 20% of LNG 
imports, (Japan buys 70% of Australia’s supply), and aspir-
ing to supply up to 40% of Japan’s LNG needs by 2020.17 
Japan’s plans for diversification of its energy sources, includ-
ing a greater dependence on imports from North America and 
Australia and the growing interest in highly price-competitive 
shale gas imports from the U.S. will not only be a direct chal-
lenge to Japan’s current suppliers in the Middle East but also 
to Russia. Japan’s close ties with the U.S., epitomized by the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, could likely deter Russian involvement in 
securing Japan’s energy imports. 
Russia and Japan have begun collaborating on renewable 
energy initiatives, namely the initiative that launched in early 
2014 to develop wind power plant technology that allows for 
operation at low temperatures in regions of the Far East.18 Japan 
recognizes that energy resources from the RFE are not only 
rich but also potentially more secure since they involve largely 
overland routes and less time-consuming than importing from 
the Middle East. Since transportation routes are considerably 
shorter – delivery time is reduced by approximately two weeks 
– Japan is in a better position to adjust to short-term fluctua-
tions in demand and the routes do not require passage through 
hostile waters or choke points. In short, delivery through the 
Sea of Japan (East Sea) is safe, efficient and timely, yet Russia 
still only accounts for a relatively small portion of Japan’s over-
all energy imports (10% of LNG imports, 4% of oil imports).19 
Nevertheless, the growing nature of Moscow’s involvement and 
the promise of the resource-rich Far East in the medium- to long-
term should not be disregarded.
 
Japan-Russia Energy Relations post-Ukraine Crisis
While the Ukraine crisis, and subsequent sanctions imposed 
on Russia by Japan, have not led to any stoppages in Russian 
energy supplies to Japan, the situation has led to delays in 
dialogue about further developing bilateral energy relations 
and has put a couple of prospective projects on hold.20 In 
September 2014, Russia reportedly proposed constructing 
an undersea LNG transport pipeline from Sakhalin to the 
northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. The pipeline would 
be the first of its kind for Japan, which does not have LNG 
pipelines connecting it to any other countries. Japanese 
media sources allege that a senior official at Japan’s MOFA 
reported that the construction of the pipeline depends on 
the outcome of the Ukraine issue and ongoing negotiations 
about the territorial dispute over the Northern Territories. 
Prior to this suggestion, Moscow did not show any interest 
in such an arrangement, however it now views the increased 
pipeline supplies to China as a potential alternative to the 
Vladivostok LNG plant project, which would have a nota-
ble effect on Japan’s anticipated LNG supply, (the plant is 
expected to account for up to 13% of LNG imports).21 Russia 
is still unable to secure major Japanese investment into the 
RFE and continues to seek support in the post-Ukraine envi-
ronment. Gazprom’s monopoly on many of the projects in the 
region has been pointed to by energy analysts as a possible 
hindrance to foreign financing. The sudden drop in oil prices 
in December 2014 and the precarious state of the Russian 
economy are notable challenges to Russia’s energy market. 
In December 2014, Japan upgraded its sanctions against Rus-
sia to include a list of individuals and organizations linked 12 For figures and overviews of the projects, see: Masumi Motomura, “Japan’s 
Need for Russian Oil and Gas: A shift in energy flows to the Far East,” Energy 
Policy 74 (2014): 68-79; Michael Bradshaw, “Russian LNG Exports to Asia: Cur-
rent Status and Future Prospects,” NBR Special Report #44, November 2013. 
13 “Japan-Russia Summit Meeting on the Occasion of APEC Leaders’ Meeting in 
Vladivostok (Overview),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 8 September 2012. 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/jfpu/2012/09/0908-0 3.html 
14 Itochu, a major trading company in Japan, is heading the group. Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi are also part of the project.
15 EIA 2014.
16 “Japan Revitalization Strategy,” Government of Japan, 2014. http://www.
kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/honbunEN.pdf
17 “Japan Pinning LNG Hopes on Diversified Future Supply,” Global LNG, 
Week 42 Issue 342, 23 October 2014. http://newsbase.com/commentary/
japan-pinning-lng-hopes-diversified-future-supply
18  Vladislav Vorotnikov, “Russia and Japan Collaborate on Wind Energy In-
novation in the Far East,” Renewable Energy World.com, 10 March 2014. 
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2014/03/rus-
sia-and-japan-collaborate-on-wind-energy-innovation-in-the-far-east 
19 EIA 2014.
20 Ely Ratner and Elizabeth Rosenberg, “Pointless Punishment: How the 
Sanctions on Russia Will Hurt Asia,” Foreign Affairs, 18 August 2014. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/139039 
21  Clint Richards, “Russia and Japan’s Pipeline Dilemma,” The Diplomat, 15 
October 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/russia-and-japans-pipe-
line-dilemma/
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to separatist Ukrainian regions.22 While this marks Japan’s 
ongoing involvement in the sanctions regime, as confirmed by 
Japanese officials, it is very unlikely that it will affect Putin’s 
planned 2015 visit to Japan or have ramifications for Japan-
Russia energy ties. Russian analysts suggest that the sanctions 
imposed by Japan have had little effect on bilateral business 
and that, rather the contrary, business relations have expanded 
and diversified in the aftermath of the “sanctions fever.” 
Conclusions
Japan-Russia energy relations have come a long way in a short 
period of time. Despite the significant convergence in Russia-
Japan energy relations that the Fukushima crisis accommo-
dated for, countries in the Middle East still hold significant 
shares of Japan’s energy market and Russia remains a minor 
supplier to Japan. Future LNG supplies originating in the Far 
East will increase Russia’s role in Japan’s market in the mid- 
to long term. Russia can provide Japan with a safe and short 
transport route as well as an abundant supply that will allow 
Japan to meet fluctuations in demand. However, it will also 
have to offer a competitive price and quality in order to com-
pete with Japan’s Middle East suppliers, Australia, Canada 
and relatively cheap U.S. shale gas exports. 
Rivalry among states in the Asian vector will likely impact the 
Asia-Pacific region’s energy diplomacy in the years to come. 
Energy integration with Russia presents Japan with an opportu-
nity to semi-counter burgeoning Russia-China relations as well 
as China’s regional impact. Russia still seeks to secure Japanese 
investment in the RFE and Japanese labor contributions are 
also welcomed, and viewed more positively than Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and labor from Chinese sources. As such, Japan 
can potentially counter Chinese influence in the region through 
increased FDI, high tech cooperation and labor exchange. 
Japan’s planned restart of two nuclear reactors in 2015 is not 
an indicator of a complete return to nuclear dependency. The 
restart will not account for the major demand that the nation 
has for alternative resources nor will it work towards the gov-
ernment’s plan to diversify energy sources in the interest of 
both economy and energy security. With nuclear energy still 
off the grid, Japan will continue to look to diversify its energy 
supply and will further research developing renewables on its 
home turf and elsewhere. 
 
Overall, Japan and Russia have managed to safeguard and 
develop bilateral relations in the wake of the crisis. The coun-
tries worked to maximize energy relations post-Fukushima 
and to minimize the potential negative consequences of the 
Ukraine crisis and Japan’s sanctions on bilateral relations. 
Policy Implications
• In the face of ongoing sanctions, Russia wants to reduce 
dependence on European markets and is eager to engage 
the increasingly competitive Asian energy market. In addi-
tion to Russia, Qatar and Australia want to expand their 
LNG supplying roles to Japan. While the RFE’s close proxim-
ity and relatively secure routes are very attractive to Japan, 
questions remain about pricing and Japan’s willingness to 
move away from traditional suppliers. Russia should high-
light what it can contribute to the Japanese market – fast, 
safe routes – and should offer competitive pricing. The low 
oil price and the instability of Russia’s economy threaten 
its energy diplomacy. If Russia’s economy crashes, the oil 
prices continue to stay low and Tokyo will likely turn to 
other sources, namely the Middle East, for energy. Whether 
oil prices stay down is an open question however Russia 
should take precautionary measures to address such a sce-
nario when marketing its energy to Japan.
• Although the Japan-Russia relationship has endured the 
Ukraine crisis, there are longstanding bilateral issues – 
namely, the territorial dispute over the Northern Territories 
and the unsigned Peace Treaty – that will likely hinder 
cooperation in the future if left unaddressed. Signing a 
peace deal would alleviate security concerns and could 
potentially foster further cooperation and investment in 
developing the RFE. 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of 
the end of WWII and is a prime occasion for the Japanese 
and Russian leaders to make it a priority to explicitly 
address these issues and to propose a road forward.
22 “Additional Designation of Individuals and Entities Subject to the Measures 
to Freeze Assets of Those Who Are Considered to Be Directly Involved in ‘An-
nexation’ of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol or 
Destabilization of Eastern Part of Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 9 
December 2014. http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press3e_000028.html
